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CUFF EX REL. B.C. v. VALLEY CENTRAL 
SCHOOL DISTRICT: THE BATTLE BETWEEN 
SAFETY AND LIBERTY IN AN ERA OF 
STUDENT VIOLENCE 
Christopher Marquis* 
Abstract: On March 22, 2012, in Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Central School Dis-
trict, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that suspend-
ing a student for writing a wish to blow up the school did not violate the 
student’s First Amendment right of expression. The court concluded that 
the suspension satisfied the substantial disruption test outlined by the Su-
preme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. 
The Second Circuit, however, could have reached the same result without 
undermining student speech protections by applying the Supreme Court’s 
narrower standard presented in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser, 
which allows restrictions on certain types of speech based on the school’s 
role in teaching students societal values. Applying the Fraser standard in 
this case would have given school officials the tools necessary to protect 
students from violence, while preserving the students’ free speech rights. 
Introduction 
 On September 12, 2007, B.C., a minor, was suspended from the 
Berea Elementary School in Montgomery, New York, for six days.1 The 
suspension stemmed from an assignment given to B.C. by his science 
teacher “to fill in a picture of an astronaut and write various things in 
various sections of the astronaut.”2 When the teacher instructed the 
students to write a “wish” in the leg of the astronaut, B.C. wrote that he 
wished to “‘[b]low up the school with the teachers in it.’”3 After B.C. 
showed this to his fellow students, one of the students brought the wish 
to the attention of the teacher.4 The teacher then sent B.C. to the 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013). 
1 Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (Cuff IV ), 677 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2012). 
B.C. was suspended for a period of five days out of school suspension and one day in 
school suspension. Id. 
2 Id. at 111. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
40 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33: E. Supp. 
school’s principal, who, after questioning B.C. about the “wish,” con-
tacted the superintendent and issued a suspension.5 
 B.C.’s parents, the Cuffs, sued the school district on his behalf 
claiming that the school’s actions violated B.C.’s First Amendment right 
to free speech.6 The school district moved for summary judgment and 
the district court granted the motion.7 The Cuffs appealed the grant of 
summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, where a three-judge panel affirmed the decision.8 The panel split 
two-to-one on the correct application of the substantial disturbance 
standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District.9 The majority opinion de-
ferred to school administrator’s judgment as to the risk of a substantial 
disturbance, whereas the dissent made a more exacting inquiry into the 
reasonableness of the school’s judgment.10 Although the dissenting 
opinion coheres with the principles of Tinker, the court should have 
adopted the approach employed by the Supreme Court in Bethel School 
District Number 403 v. Fraser because it more effectively balances school 
safety and free speech protections.11 
I. No Laughing Matter: A Violent Wish Ends  
in Suspension and Litigation 
 On September 12, 2007, B.C.’s science teacher, Tara DeBold, 
asked her students to write statements within a picture of an astronaut, 
and specifically to “write a ‘wish’ in the left leg of the astronaut.”12 Ac-
cording to testimony, DeBold, in response to students’ questions, told 
them that “‘you can write, like, anything you want . . . you can involve a 
missile . . . [y]ou can write about missiles.’”13 B.C. told the other stu-
                                                                                                                      
5 Id. at 111–12. 
6 Id. at 112. 
7 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 112. 
8 Id. 
9 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504, 509, 514 (1969) (hold-
ing that, absent a showing that school officials had a reasonable belief that the speech in 
question was likely to cause a substantial disruption of the school environment, students had 
a First Amendment right to wear armbands in protest of the Vietnam war); see Cuff IV, 677 
F.3d at 112–13; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 118–19 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
10 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 113; id. at 115 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
11 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (holding that a stu-
dent’s profane speech could be restricted in light of the school’s role in teaching students 
socially acceptable values); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 115 (Pooler, J., dis-
senting). 
12 Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (Cuff IV ), 677 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2012). 
13 Id. 
2013] The Battle Between Safety and Liberty in an Era of Student Violence 41 
dents that he planned to write that his wish was to “‘[b]low up the 
school with the teachers in it,’” and the students laughed in reply.14 
C.P., a student seated nearby, looked at B.C.’s completed picture and, 
per B.C.’s testimony, also laughed.15 C.P. then reported the drawing to 
DeBold, who testified that C.P. appeared to be very worried.16 Follow-
ing a conversation with C.P., DeBold confronted B.C. and asked him “if 
he meant what he had written.”17 When B.C. did not respond, DeBold 
sent him to Principal Knecht’s office.18 
 B.C. had a history of misbehavior prior to the incident.19 In Janu-
ary of 2006, B.C. drew a picture of a person shooting a gun, above 
which he wrote “‘[o]ne day I shot 4 people each of them got fo[ur] 
blows + they were dead. I wasted 20 bulits [sic] on them.’”20 His teacher 
notified the school psychologist, and school officials alerted B.C.’s par-
ents.21 In response, B.C. claimed he was depicting a game of paintball.22 
In the spring of 2007, B.C. wrote a story about “‘a big wind [that] de-
stroyed every school in America . . . [and] every body ran for there [sic] 
life and than [sic] all adults died and all the kids were alive. Than [sic] 
all the kids died.”23 This was also reported to the school psychologist, 
who did not speak to B.C.24 Additionally, teachers and administrators 
had previously disciplined B.C. for physical altercations during recess 
and in the hallways, and for other instances of rough play.25 
 Principal Knecht and Assistant Principal Malley consulted the su-
perintendent for advice on punishment, relaying the incident, B.C.’s 
past behavioral problems, and the possibility that B.C. had scared C.P.26 
The superintendent and the principals agreed that suspension was ap-
propriate.27 Soon thereafter, Principal Knecht met with B.C. and his 
parents, and B.C. expressed that he did not mean what he wrote and 
                                                                                                                      
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. According to B.C.’s testimony, C.P. had a history of tattling on B.C. whenever he 
did something inappropriate. Id. at 117 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
17 Id. at 111 (majority opinion). 
18 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 111. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 111. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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that it was just a joke.28 After the meeting, Knecht issued B.C.’s suspen-
sion in writing.29 
 B.C.’s parents, William and Margaret Cuff, appealed the suspension 
to the District’s Board of Education.30 After the Board of Education up-
held the suspension, the Cuffs then brought a section 1983 action on 
behalf of B.C. against the Board and Principal Knecht.31 Specifically, the 
Cuffs alleged that the suspension was not only excessive, but also vio-
lated B.C.’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression.32 
 On May 5, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York granted the School District and the principal’s motion to 
dismiss, holding that the school administrators reasonably believed that 
the speech was likely to cause a substantial disruption.33 On appeal, the 
Second Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court.34 The School District and the principal filed for summary 
judgment, which the district court granted, and the Cuffs again ap-
pealed the decision to the Second Circuit.35 
II. The Tinker Substantial Disruption Test and Other 
Standards for Student Speech 
 In analyzing the Cuffs’ complaint, the Second Circuit discussed the 
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 1969 in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District.36 Pursuant to Tinker, public 
school students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”37 The First Amendment 
rights of public school students are not the same as those enjoyed by 
                                                                                                                      
28 Id. at 112. 
29 Id. 
30 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 110, 112. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a federal civil action for state actions which de-
prive citizens of “rights, privileges, and immunities” protected by the Constitution); Cuff IV, 
677 F.3d at 112. 
32 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 112. 
33 Cuff ex rel. B.C v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (Cuff I), 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 417, 422, 424 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 341 F. App’x 692 (2d Cir. 2009). 
34 Fed. R. Civ. Pro. § 12(b)(6) (permitting dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted”); see Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. 
(Cuff II), 341 F. App’x 692, 693 (2d Cir. 2009). 
35 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 110, 112; Cuff ex rel. B.C v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (Cuff III), 714 F. 
Supp. 2d 462, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012). 
36 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969); Cuff ex rel. 
B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (Cuff IV), 677 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2012). 
37 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
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adults in other settings, however, and instead “must be ‘applied in light 
of the special characteristics of the school environment.’”38 
 In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that school officials may not 
suppress student speech unless it is to prevent a substantial disturbance 
or material disruption of the school environment.39 In order to limit 
student speech, school officials must show more than an “undifferenti-
ated fear or apprehension of disturbance,” and cannot act merely to 
avoid any “discomfort and unpleasantness” caused by the expression of 
unpopular viewpoints.40 In applying Tinker’s substantial disturbance 
test, courts ask whether the school’s apprehension of “substantial dis-
ruption of or material interference with school activities” was reason-
able.41 The courts do not require that there be an actual or inevitable 
disruption.42 Rather, courts assess whether the administrator might rea-
sonably forecast disruption from the student speech in question.43 
 Tinker, however, is not the only standard employed to assess stu-
dent speech.44 In 1986, in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser, the 
Supreme Court set out a separate standard for certain types of student 
speech, including vulgar and offensive speech.45 This standard allows 
schools to consider their role in teaching students “the boundaries of 
socially appropriate behavior” when regulating student speech.46 
A. Reasonableness and Deference to the School: The Majority’s Interpretation of 
the Tinker Substantial Disruption Test 
 In upholding B.C.’s suspension, the Second Circuit majority ana-
lyzed B.C.’s wish in the astronaut drawing under Tinker’s substantial dis-
turbance standard.47 Emphasizing B.C.’s disciplinary history, the school 
psychologist’s concerns, the fact that the drawing had been shown to 
other students, and that the teacher “perceived C.P. to be ‘very wor-
                                                                                                                      
38 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker, 393 
U.S. at 506). 
39 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 513. 
40 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09. 
41 DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 623 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2010); see 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
42 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 113; Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008). 
43 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514; DeFabio, 623 F.3d at 79; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51. 
44 Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; see Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
45 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675, 683. 
46 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 685 (holding that a student’s profane speech could be re-
stricted in light of the school’s role in teaching students socially acceptable values). 
47 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 113; see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
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ried,’” the court held that it was reasonably foreseeable that B.C.’s 
drawing may generate a substantial disruption within the school.48 The 
majority then noted that school administrators have “wide leeway” to 
discipline students for violent writing and conduct.49 
 The court also concluded that B.C.’s sharing of the image with his 
classmates could reasonably be perceived as an “attention-grabbing de-
vice,” contributing to the threat of a substantial disruption.50 The court 
found that school administrators could reasonably believe that, if left 
unchecked, other students could very well imitate or intensify this type 
of behavior, spurring more disciplinary issues at the school.51 Finally, the 
court observed that ongoing behavior of this sort might decrease paren-
tal confidence in school safety.52 This in turn, would have collateral con-
sequences such as the need to hire school security, or even a drop in 
enrollment.53 In light of the above considerations, the majority con-
cluded that it was reasonable for school officials to conclude that such 
conduct may have caused a substantial disruption of the school envi-
ronment.54 Accordingly, the Second Circuit upheld B.C.’s suspension.55 
B. Requiring a Causal Nexus Between Speech and Disruption: The Dissent’s 
Interpretation of the Tinker Substantial Disturbance Test 
 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Pooler argued that a jury could 
reasonably conclude that B.C.’s behavior was unlikely to cause even “a 
stir at school, let alone a substantial disruption.”56 She contended that 
the majority failed to make all reasonable inferences and interpret all 
ambiguities in favor of the non-moving party, as required at the sum-
                                                                                                                      
48 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 113–14. 
49 Id. at 114; see also Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766, 772 (5th Cir. 
2007) (finding that threatening speech regarding a Columbine-type shooting at a school 
was not protected by the First Amendment because “administrators must be permitted to 
react quickly and decisively to address a threat of physical violence against their students”); 
Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 980, 984–85 (11th Cir. 2007) (ruling that 
school officials did not violate a student’s First Amendment rights when they suspended 
her for writing a narrative depicting her shooting her math teacher); Doe ex rel. Doe v. 
Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619, 626 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that a rea-
sonable school official in possession of a student’s letter describing the rape and murder 
of a classmate would have taken action based on the letter’s content, and thus concluding 
that the letter constituted a “true threat”). 
50 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114. 
51 Id. at 114–15. 
52 Id. at 115. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 115 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
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mary judgment stage.57 Judge Pooler’s opinion turned on her belief 
that a jury could find that the school did not reasonably believe the 
speech could cause a substantial disruption.58 
 Judge Pooler interpreted Tinker as requiring “a causal link between 
the speech that school officials want to suppress and the substantial dis-
ruption that they wish to avoid.”59 Based on this, she argued that cer-
tain facts relied on by the majority, such as B.C.’s disciplinary record, 
were not directly relevant in an examination under Tinker.60 This was 
because, she reasoned, the question was whether the speech itself was 
likely to cause a disruption, not whether it signaled a future violent act 
by B.C.61 This standard nevertheless leaves room for school officials to 
engage in certain non-punitive actions to ensure the safety of other 
students.62 For example, the dissent stated that school officials may de-
tain a student to investigate the veracity of a threat of violent conduct.63 
This seems to mitigate the concerns raised by the majority that school 
officials would be unable to respond to violent attacks at school.64 On 
the whole, Judge Pooler’s interpretation of Tinker gives less deference 
to the perception of school officials than the majority does, and re-
quires a showing that the student speech in question could reasonably 
cause a substantial disruption.65 
C. Other Standards Applied to Student Speech 
 Courts have also looked beyond the Tinker standard to analyze stu-
dent speech.66 In Fraser, the Supreme Court upheld a suspension of a 
student who gave a speech laden with sexual innuendos at a student 
assembly.67 The Court held that it was “a highly appropriate function of 
public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive 
terms in public discourse.”68 It reasoned that the fundamental values of 
                                                                                                                      
57 See id. at 116. Judge Pooler pointed to testimony showing the students laughed when 
shown B.C.’s wish, and that the one allegedly concerned student may have had ulterior 
motives for reporting the statement to her teacher. Id. at 116–17. 
58 See id. at 118–19. 
59 Id. at 122. 
60 Id. at 121. 
61 Id. at 122. 
62 See Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 123 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at 114 (majority opinion); id. at 123 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
65 See id. at 120, 122 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
66 Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; see Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 509. 
67 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678–80. 
68 Id. at 683. 
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a democratic society do not support highly offensive or threatening 
speech.69 Furthermore, it asserted that a school’s role encompasses in-
stilling these values in its students.70 Thus, a school may suspend a stu-
dent for the use of offensive language as part of its mission to educate 
them as to the values of a democratic society.71 The Fraser standard not 
only considers the risk of disruption under Tinker, but also balances the 
student’s speech rights “against society’s countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”72 
 In 2007, in Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
Fraser, while building upon Tinker, is a separate standard and not merely 
an expansion of the substantial disruption test.73 In Morse, the Court 
upheld a suspension of a student who displayed a banner at a school 
event that read, “‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.’”74 The Court held that the 
speech in question could reasonably be interpreted as promoting illegal 
drug use, and thus could be regulated in light of the governmental in-
terest in preventing such drug use.75 Therefore, it is evident that the Fra-
ser standard allows school officials to regulate student speech that could 
not be regulated under Tinker when there is a countervailing societal 
interest in educating students as to the limits of socially acceptable be-
havior.76 
III. The Missing Standard: Striking a Balance Between Safety 
and Liberty 
 In Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Central School District the majority and the 
dissent analyzed whether B.C.’s violent statement was protected speech 
under the Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District sub-
stantial disruption test.77 Both opinions, however, failed to strike an ap-
propriate balance between the protection of student speech and the 
societal interest in preventing violence.78 Permitting unburdened ex-
                                                                                                                      
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 683, 685. 
72 Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; see Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
73 Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; see Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
74 Morse, 551 U.S. at 397–98, 410. 
75 Id. at 408. 
76 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681; see Morse, 551 U.S. at 405; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514. 
77 Cuff ex. rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. (Cuff IV ), 677 F.3d 109, 118–19 (2d Cir. 
2012) (Pooler, J., dissenting); see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 508 (1969). 
78 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
511; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114–15; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 120 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
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pression of views in schools exposes students to a greater variety of 
viewpoints than just those within the school curriculum.79 This benefit 
must be balanced against the need to ensure that students are safe and 
that they learn the bounds of acceptable conduct.80 Taking these dual 
interests into consideration, the standard employed by the Supreme 
Court in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser would have been more 
appropriate in the instant case.81 
A. Failings of the Majority and Dissent in Striking a Balance Between Speech 
Protections and the Threat of Violence 
 The majority opinion in Cuff IV is questionable in two respects.82 
First, the majority relied on cases that were primarily decided on 
grounds inapplicable to the Tinker analysis in order to support the 
proposition that school officials should have broad leeway in determin-
ing whether violent speech poses a threat of a substantial disturbance.83 
For example, the majority cited the 2002 case Doe v. Pulaski County Spe-
cial School District, in which the Eighth Circuit held that a student letter 
describing the rape and murder of a classmate constituted a true threat 
and could be prohibited on those grounds.84 Thus, the holding regu-
lated speech on grounds applicable to the greater public and did not 
implicate the special conditions placed on the school environment.85 
The court also cited the Fifth Circuit’s 2007 case, Ponce v. Socorro Inde-
pendent School District, for the notion that school officials have broad dis-
                                                                                                                      
79 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
80 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114; Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 
508 F.3d 765, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2007). 
81 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114–15; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 120 
(Pooler, J., dissenting). 
82 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 123 
(Pooler, J., dissenting). 
83 See Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114; Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771–72 (applying Morse and finding 
that speech threatening violence at school was not protected by the First Amendment); 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622, 626–27 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(considering whether the student speech in question was a “true threat,” which is desig-
nated by the Supreme Court as a category of speech to which the First Amendment does 
not apply, and declining to employ the Tinker substantial disturbance standard). 
84 See Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114; Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 619, 626–27. 
85 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (noting that the First Amendment should be “applied in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment”); Pulaski, 306 F.3d at 622, 
626–27 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)) (holding that “threats of 
violence also fall within the realm of speech that the government can proscribe without 
offending the First Amendment”). 
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cretion in their determinations regarding violent speech.86 In that case, 
the court upheld a suspension of a student for speech describing a 
“Columbine style” shooting attack on the school.87 The Fifth Circuit did 
not analyze Ponce under the Tinker substantial disruption standard, but 
instead employed the standard articulated in Morse v. Frederick to up-
hold the student’s suspension.88 
 Second and more importantly, the majority’s interpretation of the 
Tinker standard, if applied in Tinker itself, would arguably have resulted 
in a different conclusion.89 The majority in Cuff IV seemed to hold that 
a simple undifferentiated fear of potential violence and unrest was suf-
ficient to meet the Tinker substantial disruption standard.90 Tinker in-
volved a school’s attempt to prohibit a protest of the Vietnam War, an 
immensely controversial subject at that time, in order to avoid a poten-
tially inflammatory situation.91 Nevertheless, the court in Tinker re-
quired school officials to have more than just a general apprehension 
of violence.92 The majority opinion in Cuff IV did reference the poten-
tial that other students may resort to violence if this speech were left 
unchecked and also additional concerns that local parents may have 
about school safety.93 Although concerns about violence and distress 
were certainly present in Tinker, they were not sufficient to support a 
prohibition of the speech in that case.94 The majority’s opinion could 
be read to limit the expression of even core political speech upon any 
school official’s determination that such speech may negatively affect 
the school environment.95 
                                                                                                                      
86 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114; see also Ponce, 508 F.3d at 772 (reasoning that school officials 
must be able “to react quickly and decisively” in order to address threats of violence at 
school). 
87 Ponce, 508 F.3d at 766–67, 772. 
88 Id. at 771–72; see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (holding that “the 
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse” allows schools to restrict “student 
expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use”). The court in Morse 
made clear that it was not analyzing the student speech under Tinker. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 
404–05. 
89 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 510 (articulating the limits of its standard by explaining 
that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the 
right to freedom of expression”); Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114–15. 
90 See Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114–15. 
91 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510 & n.4. 
92 Id. at 508. 
93 Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114–15. 
94 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 509 n.3, 514. 
95 See Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 114–15; id. at 120 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
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 The dissent, on the other hand, is more doctrinally consistent with 
Tinker.96 The dissent’s approach, however, may ultimately expose schools 
and students to a rising tide of violent speech and deprive them of the 
tools necessary to prevent tragic attacks like those that occurred at Col-
umbine.97 
 In applying the Tinker substantial disturbance test to the facts be-
fore them, the majority and dissent failed to balance the countervailing 
interests in free speech and promoting socially acceptable behavior.98 
The majority’s interpretation of the Tinker standard undermines pro-
tections for student speech, leaving students subject to school adminis-
trators’ determinations about the appropriate scope of discourse in 
schools.99 Conversely, the dissent’s interpretation may leave schools 
without the means to combat violent behavior among their students.100 
B. The Fraser Standard: A Better Approach to Balance Student  
Speech and Safety 
 Both the majority and dissent in Cuff IV failed to adequately pro-
tect students from the threat of violence and also ensure that students’ 
speech is not unduly burdened by school administrators.101 The court 
overlooked an important tool in student First Amendment jurispru-
dence that would have provided a more appropriate solution to this 
problem.102 The standard the Supreme Court used in Fraser and its rea-
soning in Morse supports the notion that certain types of speech are less 
appropriate in the school environment given the countervailing inter-
est of inculcating students with societal values.103 This standard has 
been used to support prohibitions on other types of speech that other-
wise may not have met the substantial disruption test and are unre-
                                                                                                                      
96 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 120 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
97 See Cuff IV, 677 F.3d at 119–22 (Pooler, J., dissenting); Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771–72. 
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stricted outside of the school environment, such as “vulgar and lewd” 
statements or those supporting drug use.104 
 The Fraser analysis is applicable to the violent speech in this case.105 
The First Amendment has historically protected violent speech less 
than other forms of speech.106 Additionally, the court in Cuff IV prop-
erly alluded to the societal interest in discouraging violent behavior.107 
Furthermore courts, through a Fraser-type analysis, have previously pro-
vided lesser protection to violent student speech in order to support its 
prohibition.108 Doing so in this case would have given school adminis-
trators the tools necessary to protect students and the classroom envi-
ronment without undermining the important protections for speech 
that Tinker offers.109 Protection of speech within public schools ensures 
that schools do not become “enclaves of totalitarianism” in which stu-
dents are “confined to the expression of those sentiments that are offi-
cially approved.”110 At the same time, this concern must be balanced 
against the school’s role in ensuring both that students are safe, and 
that they learn the bounds of socially acceptable behavior.111 
Conclusion 
 Although courts usually cite Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Com-
munity School District when assessing First Amendment rights in the 
school environment, the majority and dissent in Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley 
Central School District erred in doing so. Given the lesser protections for 
violent speech and the societal interest in discouraging violent behav-
ior, the court could have provided schools with more effective tools to 
prevent violent behavior while simultaneously protecting student 
speech. This could have been accomplished by applying the standard 
the Supreme Court laid out in Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser. 
Such an approach would protect students from violent behavior at 
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school and also prevent the suppression of their First Amendment 
speech rights by school administrators. 
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